The lack of meaningful
progress in terms of substance in Myanmar’s peace process is partly due to the
government. If the government still commits to achieving its objective of adopting
federal and democratic principles with other stakeholders in the political
dialogue through the 21st Century Panglong Conference before the general
elections in 2020, it must thoroughly review its own peace-related committees –
the National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC) and Peace Commission (PC)
in particular – and implement necessary reforms. Once reformed, the committees must
have sufficient resources, especially in the field of human resources.
When we observe
the actual operations of the government’s peace teams since they came to power
in 2016, there are two major problem areas that need to be reformed. The first problem
is the non-inclusion of top government leaders into the existing formal peace
process teams that the government has created. Under the previous government led
by President Thein Sein, the formal policy-making body of the Union Peace-Making
Central Committee (UPCC)[i]
comprised all senior leaders of various key ministries and branches of the
government. Due to the broad and legitimate representation of all top leaders of
the government, the UPCC was very effective in adopting and directing policies
for the peace process on behalf of the government. The UPCC, as a policy-making
body, also served as the unified voice of the government.
Although the current
government, led by the National League for Democracy (NLD), has formed the
National Reconciliation and Peace Center (NRPC)[ii]
as a policy-making body for the peace process, just like the UPCC, it unfortunately
does not include the formal heads of state and key figures of the major government
branches; the President, the two Vice-Presidents, and Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, who leads the
country’s most powerful military institution. Since the Myanmar military has
been one of the main stakeholders and key players, it has long been evident
that any government policy that is not supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Myanmar Armed Forces will simply not work. If the government were to include the
Commander-in-Chief in its policy-making body, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing could have “a shared platform” for
regular interactions between the two that would deepen cooperation between the
government and the Myanmar military, which is necessary for the success of both
the peace process and the overall democratic reform agenda. With regard to the
prominent figures with formal political power, it can be argued that the
exclusion of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from the policy-making body is one
of the main strategic blunders that the current government has made. Sooner or
later, it is advisable for State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her
government to restructure its NRPC or create an alternative body to include the
Commander-in-Chief.
With the lack
of substantive constitutional amendment to the 2008 Constitution, Myanmar is
still largely under the draconian control of the military. There is no such
thing as civilian democratic control over its armed forces, as in a normal
democratic country. Until and unless a democratic principle of civilian
supremacy over armed forces is enshrined in the constitution, it would be
beneficial for any government to involve the Commander-in-Chief in their formal
policy-making body in their efforts to reform. It is also apparent that the
exclusion of the Commander-in-Chief has contributed to the growing gap and the
lack of strong cooperation between the NLD-led government and the military. The
lack of cohesion is clear, since a government negotiation team between the
government and military has created another layer of complication/ambiguity for
the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), which have been complaining that they
seem to be dealing with two different governments; one led by the NLD
government and another led by the military.
The second weakness
of the current government peace process team is a lack of clear division of
roles and responsibilities with a clear mandate for the members of its peace committees
and the failure to delegate responsibility. This is the case for Dr. Tin Myo
Win, who is the government’s chief negotiator as well as Chairman of the Peace
Commission (PC), and Minister U Kyaw Tint Shwe, who is a Union Minister for the
State Counsellor Office as well as Vice-Chairman 1 of the NRPC. Both are of
course two of the most important figures who lead the implementation of the
government’s overall peace process effort. The problem is that it is not clear which
of the two has been given a more central role of leadership by Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi. As a result, people in the peace process, especially their counterparts, are
confused and do not know if they should deal with Dr. Tin Myo Win or Minister U
Kyaw Tint Shwe. Some even wonder whether these two have any decision-making
power and ability to negotiate at all. The two of them often act simply like a
messenger to deliver the messages of State Counsellor as opposed to trying to negotiate.
During the previous government, President Thein Sein appointed Minister U Aung
Min as his chief negotiator, who was the principal actor in the peace process
from the government’s side. Everyone knew that Minister U Aung Min had been given
full responsibility for leading the peace process and had the full mandate of the
President. If there were any questions about the government’s plan for the
peace process, everyone talked to chief negotiator U Aung Min. It was obvious
that Minister U Aung Min was the one who led the government’s negotiating team.
It is worth mentioning here that the chain of command between President Thein
Sein and U Aung Min was quite clear to everyone.
Under the
current government, the chain of command among its committees is still unclear.
Most clearly, everything revolves around State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The problem is that she cannot do everything needed to lead the peace process on
her own, but needs a strong and competent team with a strong negotiating mandate
and a clear chain of command. Written or unwritten, a strong centralization of
power in the hands of one person in a multi-ethnic Myanmar/Burma is not
conducive to meet the enormous challenges of reform process in all angles
facing the country. As some of EAO leaders explained it, “Forget about
negotiating federal principles or ceasefire matters; the frustration we have
with the government teams is that even what kind of dinner they would like to
order has to be submitted first to the Minister for approval.”
With Dr. Tin
Myo Win as the current government chief negotiator, everyone knows that he does
not have the same level of negotiation power or mandate that Minister U Aung
Min had during the previous government. Not just Dr. Tin Myo Win, also the members
of the Peace Commission who do all the negotiations work with the ethnic armed
organizations that have not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),
have not been given a strong mandate to negotiate and decide. What they have
done so far is simply just a meeting to exchange their views to keep the
process alive, and they are not doing “actual negotiations”. That is why the Peace
Commission has not been effective in leading the negotiation efforts with the
non-signatories of EAOs so far. Moving forward, the Peace Commission and its
team must be given stronger mandates. The Peace Commission must also have
sufficient human resources; more competent people with both political
analytical skills and technical know-how must be appointed to the Peace Commission
to carry out the government policies and effectively support the Peace
Commission team.
Conclusion
The current
government has only one year left before the general elections in 2020. It now
appears that it is almost unrealistic to expect substantial outcomes from the
peace process, with the same group of people doing the same thing all over
again. Unless State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself will play a more
central and proactive role in direct negotiations with other stakeholders, whether
on federal principles or the signing of the NCA with non-signatories, she must reform
her peace architecture and reshuffle its members where necessary. Once the necessary
reforms have been implemented, all committees must have sufficient resources.
If the previous government had 50 people working on the peace process, the
NLD-led government needs to double it to 100 people, simply because the
previous government mainly dealt with ceasefire matters, while the current
government does both “ceasefire negotiations and political dialogue”. Most
importantly, as long as the most powerful man, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
is not part of the formal peace process architecture, it will not be easy to make
substantive progress from political dialogue to achieving peace.
[i]The Union Peace-Making Central
Committee (UPCC) was chaired by President Thein Sein and consisted of eleven members,
including him:
- Vice-President
U Nyan Tun (replaced U Tin Aung Myint Oo, Aug. 16, 2012)
- Vice-President
Dr. Sai Mauk Kham
- Speaker
of the Upper house U Shwe Mann
- Speaker
of the Lower house U Khin Aung Myint
- Commander-in-Chief
of the Defense Services, Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing
- Minister
of Home Affairs Lieutenant-General Ko Ko
- Defense
Minister Lieutenant-General Wai Lwin (replaced General Hla Min)
- Border
Affairs Minister Lieutenant-General Thet Naing Win (replaced
Lieutenant-General Thein Htay)
- Attorney-General
Dr. Tun Shin
- Director
of President’s Office U Min Zaw
[ii]The National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) is chaired by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi and consists of eleven members, including her:
1. State Counsellor Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi Chairperson
2.
Union Minister
for Office of the State Counsellor U Kyaw Tint Swe Vice Chair-1
3. Dr. Tin Myo Win, Chair of
Preparatory Committee for the Union Peace Vice
Chair-2 Conference – 21st Century Panglong
4. Union Minister for Border
Affairs, Lt-Gen. Ye Aung Member
5. Union Minister for Ethnic
Affairs, Nai Thet Lwin Member
6. Union Attorney-General U Tun
Tun Oo Member
7. Lt-Gen. Yar Pyae, Commander of
Bureau of Special Operations 2 Member
8. Lt-Gen. Min Naung, Commander
of Bureau of Special Operations 4 Member
9. U Khun Maung Thaung (Pinlaung
Constituency) Chair of Pyithu
Hluttaw Ethnic Affairs and
Internal Peace Implementation Committee Member
10. Daw Shila Nan Taung (a) Daw M Nan Taung (Kachin State Constituency)
Chair of Amyotha Hluttaw
Ethnic Affairs Committee Member
11. Dy. Minister for Office of the
State Counsellor U Khin Maung Tint Secretary