While trying to
find a way forward for Myanmar’s peace process, it is crucial to have a common
and similar understanding of the nature of the process and its key challenges.
Without a clear understanding of the nature of the challenges, it is simply not
possible to find a solution to the challenges. Of those parties trying to find
a solution to break the current deadlock, the leaders of the ten ethnic armed
organizations (EAOs) that signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) –
known as the NCA-S EAOs – are at the forefront. In order to find a way forward,
the leaders of the NCA-S EAOs have convened a five-day long summit, which they
called the first part of their ethnic summit, from 14 to 18 May 2019 in
Chiangmai, Thailand. However, there was no conclusive outcome from the summit
for a way forward, apart from the plan to meet again for the second part of
their summit.
One of the main
issues of contention at the NCA-S EAOs’ recent summit is whether the NCA-based
process is still viable and whether the mechanisms based on the NCA are
functioning. Although they all accept that the NCA-based process is still
viable, there are divergent views on the usefulness of the committees and
various bodies created on the basis of the NCA. Some insist that strengthening
the existing NCA-based mechanisms should be a priority, while others propose a
new approach with a Peace Process Consultative Meeting (PPCM). The PPCM itself
is a draft proposal that is still being worked on and is discussed in one of
the two working group meetings ongoing for June 20 and 21. While it is
difficult to predict the exact outcome of this internal discussion on the PPCM
between the ten NCA signatories, any reform that is not based on the NCA and
its subsequent agreements will simply not work. The NCA-based mechanisms for
the NCA-based process are the only workable path as long as everyone follows
the NCA-based process.
Technical vs. Political Will
While technical
competence to support political dialogue is always essential, the challenge
currently facing Myanmar’s peace process is not technical; it is political. The
problem has been the lack of strong political will and the continuing failure
to focus on negotiating the federal and democratic principles, which are the
core issues and the main agenda of the political dialogue. The existing
architecture of Myanmar’s peace process, including the framework and structure
of the political dialogue, is a home-grown mechanism created after studying
comparative cases of political dialogues in other countries. Legitimate leaders
from three main stakeholders in the peace process – the government, ethnic
armed organizations (EAOs) and political parties – have developed, debated and
adopted it together. No one but themselves should be blamed if they think their
existing mechanisms are not working.
The troubling
fact about the peace process of the last two years is that those who lead the
peace process are obsessed with aspects of the process and technical debates,
rather than negotiating the content of the political dialogue. The notion that
the NCA-based mechanisms do not function has nothing to do with the mechanisms
themselves, but rather with the lack of political will and the politicization
of the peace process by the leaders of the peace process. The fact that the
problem is not technical means that creating and introducing a new mechanism
will not solve the problems and challenges currently facing Myanmar’s peace process.
Introducing a new approach without trying to reform the existing mechanisms
will only prolong the process without substantive outcomes, which will fuel a
sense of growing skepticism about the overall peace process. They urgently need
to strengthen the existing mechanisms with the right resources – the right
people with effective skills and mandates – and start negotiating federal
principles to produce important outcomes in terms of political substance.
Since the
second Union Peace Conference (UPC) – 21st century Panglong – in
May, there have been no substantial negotiations on federal and democratic
principles, which is the main purpose of the political dialogue. All meetings
held between the government and the EAOs were only about conducting dialogue
for the sake of dialogue. During these meetings, they exchanged their
respective perspectives, but they did not negotiate their differences to find
negotiated agreement. As long as they do not start substantial negotiations,
their current dialogue will not produce substantive outcomes.
The Peace Process Based on the NCA vs. the 2008
Constitution
There has been
some misunderstanding and confusion about the nature, concept and central
purpose of the peace process among some of the experts who advise a number of
stakeholders, including EAOs. In order to consolidate the common understanding
of the peace process and its intention, the following clarification needs to be
made: “The ongoing political dialogue through the peace process is conducted
outside the bounds and framework of the 2008 Constitution. This means that one
of the key parties to peace process like EAOs can negotiate all the federal and
democratic principles that they want for the Union of Myanmar (Burma). The
political dialogue through the peace process is not the same as the democratic
reform process within the Parliament, which is constrained by the 2008
Constitution and existing laws.”
Although both
processes have a common objective to amend the 2008 Constitution, they differ
in terms of concept, scope, content, methodology, design and status. The
current peace process in Myanmar is based on the NCA, while the democratic
reform process within the Parliament is based on the 2008 Constitution.
Everyone who follows the country’s reform processes must understand how these
two processes are different from each other. The misunderstanding and confusion
about these two processes dilute the true essence of the peace process and are
dangerous in a sense that it could mislead people who do not have a thorough
understanding of the entire peace process. Anyone who proposes a federal reform
process based on the 2008 Constitution in the peace process, therefore,
absolutely misses the core value and essence of the peace process. If a genuine
federal system can be achieved on the basis of the 2008 Constitution, Myanmar
does not need this ongoing peace process outside Parliament.
On a related
note, there are many people for whom the link between the outcome of the peace
process and the procedure for amending the 2008 Constitution is unclear. As a
result of the peace process, there will be an agreed list of federal and
democratic principles negotiated in the current political dialogue, which will
be signed as the Union Accord (UA). According to the NCA that was signed on 15
October 2015, the parties already agreed that “all decisions adopted by the
Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong - shall be the basis
for amending, repealing and adding provisions to the Constitution and laws, in
line with established procedures” (NCA, article 22, d). In essence, the
anticipated Union Accord has a higher legal and political standing than the
2008 Constitution. This is why there is so much hope and expectation in the
current peace process when it comes to a genuine system change in a
multi-ethnic Myanmar.
It is true that
the EAOs have not yet negotiated a detailed procedure for amending the
constitution. However, they definitely plan to negotiate this planned procedure
for translating the Union Accord into the amendments of the 2008 Constitution.
This will only be a matter of time. It is therefore wrong to interpret that the
EAO leaders accept the existing 2008 constitutional amendment procedure, which
goes against the spirit and intention of the peace process conducted outside
the framework of the 2008 Constitution. Moreover, plainly put it, all
agreements made so far in the peace process, including the NCA, are signed by
the top leaders of the key stakeholders, such as the Commander-in-Chief
(C-in-C) of the Myanmar Armed Forces. This means that whatever federal
principles the C-in-C agrees on behalf of the military institution through the
political dialogue in the peace process will not encounter any scenario of
objection within the Parliament from the military MPs. The central point here
is that the military Members of Parliament (MPs) will approve any agreement that
the C-in-C has made in the peace process.
In addition to
the negotiations on the constitutional amendment procedure, the EAO leaders
also plan to negotiate the roles and responsibilities of the EAOs at all stages
of the implementation of the Union Accord and its subsequent agreements. If the
peace process progresses and secures the expected Union Accord, one thing can
be said with certainty; the EAO leaders will play significant and prominent
roles in leading as well as overseeing the entire implementation process to
realize constitutional amendments.