The ongoing active armed conflict between the
Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA) has deteriorated in terms of
frequency, number of casualties, and victimization of innocent civilians. This
is unprecedented in the history of Myanmar’s ethnic armed conflicts since 1948.
Chin and Rakhine/Arakan States are two of the least developed states in
Myanmar, but are usually regarded as the regions with the least active armed
conflict between the central government and the ethnic armed groups. That image
has changed with this constant escalation of intense fighting between the
military and the AA, as Rakhine State now becomes the central focus of the
battlefield for the Myanmar military. Unless both parties become serious about
reaching an agreement to sign a bilateral ceasefire, the fighting will continue
unabated. As one of the central committee members of the AA stated: “As long as
we are denied our rightful place to be represented in the political dialogue
just like other legitimate armed groups of Karen, Kachin, Shan, Mon, Chin, and
others, we have no choice but to resort to military means to demand what we
want.”
Currently,
the government is conducting ceasefire talks with the four members of the
Northern Alliance (NA), which includes the AA. The NA consists of the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Arakan Army (AA). At
its last meeting on 30 June 2019 in Mong La, where the general headquarters of
the Peace and Solidarity Committee/National Democratic Alliance Army (PSC/NDAA)
is located, the government delegation presented a second proposal for a
bilateral ceasefire agreement with the NA members. So far, the four NA members
have not given an official response. Although it is encouraging to see the
government delegation present a concrete ceasefire proposal for the second
time, it remains difficult to find a common ground for a final deal on the
signing of a bilateral ceasefire agreement.
There are two fundamental
difficulties that need to be addressed. The first difficulty concerns the
common position of all four NA members for the potential signing of a bilateral
ceasefire agreement. The common agreement and pledge of the four members of the
NA is that none of the members will sign a bilateral ceasefire agreement with
the government unless all four members agree to do so. Although the four of
them have one common ceasefire proposal originally developed by the Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO), each of them also has additional provisions
specific to their respective region. Even if the government could reach an agreement
on the common ceasefire proposal of the four, there must also be agreement on
the additional demands of each member. If they stick to their common position,
this means that the KIA will not sign unless there is agreement between the AA
and the government on what the AA separately demands for its bilateral
ceasefire agreement. This complication suggests that the attempt to establish a
ceasefire with the NA forming a single block is not very promising. Bilateral
talks between the government and every member of the NA may be more pragmatic.
The
second difficulty concerns the content of the specific demand of territorial
demarcation in Arakan/Rakhine State by the AA. It has long been clear that the
Myanmar military does not tolerate the deployment of ethnic armed groups in
Rakhine State. Not allowing ethnic armed groups to operate within the territory
of Rakhine State has been an uncompromising position for the Myanmar military,
especially after the unfortunate catastrophic intercommunal violence in the
past. Even one of the oldest Arakan armed groups, the Arakan Liberation Party
(ALP), has not been allowed to organize a Rakhine national dialogue in Rakhine
State, let alone to raise the question of demarcation of territory for ALP
troops, even though the ALP has been a signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA) since October 2015. All in all, it seems unlikely that the
Myanmar military will accept the territorial demarcation demands of the AA in
Rakhine State. In hindsight, if the government were to include the AA to sign
the NCA just like the ALP back in 2015, this contentious issue of territorial
demarcation would not have been as difficult as it is today.
At
the same time, it is worth noting the lack of trust of the AA leadership in the
Myanmar military’s effort to establish a ceasefire. For instance, when the
Myanmar military repeatedly excluded Rakhine State from the list of regions
where they declared a unilateral ceasefire, the AA leadership interpreted these
actions as a declaration of an all-out war against the AA. This is why they see
the ongoing military campaign against the AA in Rakhine State as a no-brainer.
With so much hostility and growing animosity built up plus the increased actual
fighting between the military and the AA, the leadership of the AA would not
accept a ceasefire agreement without territorial demarcation for AA troops for
their deployment in Rakhine State. In future negotiations between the
government and the AA for a ceasefire, finding a solution to this issue of
territorial demarcation is the most important, since a ceasefire between the
two parties may not be achieved without. Right now, all of the AA’s statements
have suggested that they feel they are winning the current war because they
feel encouraged by the growing mass support they believe they receive from the
Rakhine people. Even in this difficult time of hardship as a result of actual
fighting on the ground in Rakhine State, the AA claims that the Rakhine people
do not blame them, which they regard as a sign of support from their people.
In
fact, the AA has long been trying to relocate its troops to Rakhine territory.
Although their current military headquarters are in Laiza in Kachin State, at
the general headquarters of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the AA
does not intend to have a permanent military base in Laiza. They have always
wanted to establish their military base in Rakhine territory, and they will
continue to pursue ways and means to do so. One of the central committee
members said: “We are not Kachin. We are Arakanese and we have initiated this
armed struggle for our Rakhine people and Rakhine territory. We want and plan
to be in our Rakhine territory.” In fact, against all restrictions and efforts
to constrain their movements, they are convinced that they have achieved a
certain degree of transfer of their troops to Rakhine State, where they want a
permanent base.
Looking at the current
trend of the armed conflict and its complexities, resorting to military means
or military-to-military confrontation between the two parties is not a
plausible way to stop further bloodshed. What is absolutely necessary is a
ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the AA. Both parties have to sit
down face-to-face and make a genuine effort to reach a mutually acceptable deal
to sign a bilateral ceasefire and a peaceful way forward for the best interests
of the country and Rakhine State. While trying to negotiate a solution, both
parties need to empathize with the core values and rationale behind each
other’s respective positions, rather than just sticking to their uncompromising
positions. Otherwise, it may not be possible to reach a ceasefire between the
two parties.