One of the lingering
questions that have long been debated among supporters of the peace process in Myanmar is whether or not Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) are supporting the peace process. More poignant question
usually gets asked is “will the peace process
be continued if NLD party forms a government?”
With the landslide as well as sweeping victory of the general
elections across the country of
Myanmar by the National League for Democracy on November 8, 2015, “the question of what would be the policy and position of NLD, the government-in-waiting, on the whole peace process issue is becoming more relevant.”
If
one would look for a clue to understand NLD`s position on
the peace process question,
this
is
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Chairperson of the party, whose popularity, charisma, and sacrifice led NLD party to the resounding victories for the third time in Burma`s historic
elections:
1990, 2012 by-election, and 2015. Her persistent position on the peace process has
been
none other than continuing the peace process. In April of this year, she has repeated her
firm position stating, “I do not want to start the peace process from the scratch, but continue.” If she is the person of her own words, one can be sure that her new government will no doubt continue the peace process once there is a smooth transferring of the governing power to her political
party. What is not clear at the moment is only about whether she will recognize as
well
as keep the existing
structures, mechanisms and compositions created so far for the implementation of the
whole peace process architecture.
Since she will govern the country
with
her new team just like other genuine democratic countries
around the world, the likelihood is that she will form her new government team that
will lead the peace process. No matter what teams and personalities she would
newly appoint, the most important thing, however, is that NLD will not change the mutually agreed clauses
contained in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) text, signed between the legitimate
representatives of government of Myanmar and members of the 8 ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
Worth noting here is that all
key
stakeholders in the peace process – both signatories
and non-signatories of EAOs, the Government of Myanmar, and all political parties including NLD- have no
objection to the agreed text of the
Nationwide Ceasefire agreement (NCA).
For
the government-in-waiting, it makes sense for NLD to be very cautious with what they say on any political issue including the peace process. Unlike their times in opposition
when they could say anything against the government policies, the period now is different with their electoral victories, and therefore, it is understandable that NLD might be reluctant to publicize
its
full policy on the peace process especially during this interim period of transition of power. On the other hand, there is also a possibility that they might not have a firm policy adopted on the peace process. Whatever the case it is, leaders of the NLD have at least the next three months to develop
their own policy on peace
process before they formally inherit the governing power in March 2016.
As
much as leaders of EAOs want NLD`s active leadership, they are also not worried about the future peace process. If the military proxy party, led by President Thein Sein, has given
his
full commitment
to the peace process, there is no doubt in the minds of EAO leaders that
the
NLD party, which was born out of the historic
uprising of the people of Burma against the military dictatorship in 1988, must be more committed to the
peace process. The leading EAO
leader also stated, “I sincerely want to see the leaderships of NLD to show us their unconditional support as well as their willingness to lead the peace process unceasingly. But,
if they seem to show that peace process is not their priority and that they are not supporting
the
peace process including all the achievements that we have mutually secured with the
current
government, NLD government will be dealing
with the
armed
conflicts.
The
undeniable fact is that bringing about the so-called democratization in a multi-ethnic Union of Burma is not a solution. Any government who wants lasting peace must support the cause of our armed struggle and deal with us – the legitimate ethnic armed organizations.”
Given all these hypes of conversations about NLD`s electoral successes and its role on the peace process, one should acknowledge that all NLD`s ongoing
series of engagements since
winning general election on November 8 at least demonstrate that NLD, as soon to
be
governing Myanmar for the next five years, is in close consultations with other key actors of
the
peace process and relevant stakeholders. Among others, there was a consultation meeting clandestinely held between members of Coordination Team (CT) representing the 8 EAO
organizations that signed the NCA and Central Executive member of NLD on the day before
the
meeting of all political parties in Yangon. The meeting allowed EAO leaders that have a
formal role to lead the peace process to share update on the peace process and encourage
NLD to be pro-active on the peace process. Following that meeting, NLD has sent their two
veterans – U Nyan
Win
and U Han Tha Myint- to join the meetings of all political parties,
where representatives of political parties have selected 16 delegates to join the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). When discussing the
distribution of the
16 seats reserved
for political
parties at UPDJC, the representatives of political parties in their meeting
thoughtfully gave 2 seats each to two of the largest political parties: NLD and the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Actually, NLD was even asking for 4 positions,
but
accepted the 2 seats given to them in the meeting. This whole issue of NLD`s participation
in the peace process might be unsatisfactory to some, but one should recognize that NLD has been cooperating with key parties to the peace process.
The signing of NCA and the
legitimate representation from Myanmar government
If one looks to highlight the most political significant point from the signing of NCA, it is the
unprecedented level of high-level representation of all key leaders from the powerful branches
of the Government of Myanmar in signing the historic deal. To name some figures, the signatories who represent the government of Myanmar include President Thein Sein, Vice President Dr. Sai Mauk Kham, the Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Vice-Senior General Soe Win, Speaker of the Union Parliament
Thurah U Shwe Mann, and all Chairmen of the Parliaments. The legitimate representation from the government side is very solid, encompassing
and wide-ranging, giving an
unquestionable level of credibility to the signed Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). In the
modern political history
of the Union of
Myanmar,
there has never been
such
comprehensive,
substantive, and politically meaningful agreement ever signed that is
equivalent to the
current NCA in terms of its political significance with this
high-level
representation from
the government side. Furthermore,
the
legality of the agreement was also legitimized by the signing
of China, India, UN, EU, Japan, and Thailand as international witnesses.
President Thein
Sein`s political speech
at the signing
ceremony underscored his government`s commitment to resolving the political crises of Myanmar through a political dialogue. His speech truly reflects the nature of armed conflicts in Myanmar: democratization without peace is not the right solution to resolve the root causes of political conflict, which
resonates well with the longstanding views of Ethnic Armed Organizations. He reiterates, "Peace process is the only way to end armed conflict and bring about lasting peace in this
country. There can neither be peace without democracy
nor democracy without peace. We
must implement all provisions in NCA which includes forming the joint monitoring mechanism and other required committees as mandated by NCA.
The door is widely open for
groups who cannot sign at the moment to join the process whenever they are ready." In fact, due credit has to be given to the government
of Myanmar for its ongoing effort and undertakings for the
implementation of the agreement.
Politics with the non-signatory members of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs)
Despite sharing the similar political objectives, there is a disagreement
on strategic approach
among EAOs, which inevitably resulted in the split into two camps: those who signed and those who did not sign NCA on October 15, 2015. Realizing the imminent split, leaders of
both camps together deliberated on this very question of coordination between the signatories and non-signatories at their last summit
– September 27 to 30, 2015 in Chiangmai. The prime concern at that time was, of course, over the potential widening gap of division among EAOs after the signing of NCA by 8 armed organizations. Because they could not decide the form of
coordination
between the two camps, the decision was to revisit this issue of coordination at
their
first joint summit proposed after the signing of NCA on the 15th of
October.
The question
was
how they would coordinate between the two camps before they can form a
new coordination body between the signed and unsigned EAOs. To answer this question of coordination between the signatories and non-signatories, it was agreed to coordinate through
UNFC that would represent non-signatories and through a new coordinating body that would represent
the 8 signatories
to
NCA according to
the summit agreement
on the 28th of September. In line with that agreement, signatories to the NCA indeed formed a new
coordinating Team, later known as (CT). Following the actual signing of NCA on the 15th of October, leaders of 8 signatories proposed the convening of EAO summit - primarily between
signatories and non-signatories for November 11 and 12, 2015 in Chiangmai. However, the
non-signatories rejected the proposal of such joint meeting with the signatories. The reason
given was that the non-signatories need to have their own internal meeting to analyze the
latest political situation before making any move including meeting with their fellow brothers of those who signed NCA. Basically, some leaders of the non-signatories are of the view that “those who signed NCA have betrayed the core common position of EAO`s all-inclusive
policy in the signing of NCA even though they might not frame it exactly this way.” With so
much politicking going on among members of the non-signatories, UNFC later on took a
unilateral decision to suspend two of the founding members of the UNFC alliance- Chin
National Front (CNF) and Pa-O National Liberation
Organization (PNLO). Actually, the suspension of such core members from the ethnic alliance serve no common purpose in a
positive sense, but are only worsening the unity among EAOs.
Until now, the signatories have made every effort to coordinate, but it is the non-signatories that have shown no urgency or interest in keeping close coordination with the signatories to NCA. Their relation between the signatories and non-signatories has been characterized by this mentality of “we versus them”. So far, the politics of the post-NCA signing period is not conducive to maintaining the level of cooperation
as well as unity they have had before. The division they face is growing to the level of dissent, where leaders of the non-signatories have not only refused to attend the coordinating meeting convened by the coordination team (CT), but
would question
the
legitimacy of anything
that members
of the signatories have
undertaken
since their signing of NCA even though mandated in the agreed text of the NCA
itself. It is important that members of the non-signatories
are
realistic about their own position on the process and also not try to control the activities of the signatories (as they
are
full entitled to do anything they agreed in the NCA text). As it stands now, the political climate among the non-signatories is quite heated against the signatories, and is not
conductive for any form of positive cooperation between the two factions anytime soon.
With the existing division being getting too personal, may be the best way is to let the ethnic politics takes its own course by rather focusing on doing the real works of implementing
the
agreed provisions in NCA. In fact, there are a certain reasons why leaders of
the
non- signatories are not willing to sign the NCA. Other than their adherence
to the all-inclusive policy in signing NCA, the non-signatories are looking at the following two conditions: the reduction (if not elimination)
of the military offensives in some ethnic states and the implementation of the agreed NCA text. Time and concrete actions on the ground are key to
answering these questions of the two underlined conditions. Parties to the NCA agreement start answering this question of implementation of the NCA. Clearly, without seeing the reduction of military offensives on the ground in Shan and Kachin
states, and robust
mechanisms
to implement the agreement,
the
efforts to bring on board the non-signatories to join the process would be ineffective.
On the implementation of NCA question, there are number of areas where the government proves with concrete actions. Two days before the signing of NCA on October 15, members of the signatories to NCA are officially taken off the list of the notorious unlawful association act. In additions, parties to the agreement also already set up the three main committees to
lead the post-NCA process within windows of the
agreed timeframes. The committees already
created are the
Joint Implementation Coordination
Meeting (JICM), Joint
Ceasefire
Monitoring Committee (JCM), and Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). They
also finished the military
code
of conduct (CoC) and Terms of reference (ToR) for the Joint Monitoring Committee. Soon, the state-level joint monitoring mechanism will be set up in
Shan state to start the actual
monitoring tasks. To undertake the process of developing as well
as finalizing framework for political dialogue, UPDJC has also begun meeting with political parties, one of the 3 main constituencies to the political dialogue. UPDJC comprises of 48
members in total, 16 each representing
the 3 constituencies: Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), the government
of Myanmar, and registered political parties. Both EAOs and the
government have already provided list of names for their respective representatives for the UPDJC. From the meeting among members of the political parties on November 21 and 22, they have also selected their representatives
who
would represent political parties for the 16
seats reserved at UPDJC. The main point to take away from all of these series of meetings and consultations among different working committees after the signing of NCA is that “parties to the
agreement
have already
undertaken the
actual
works
of implementing the agreed provisions of the
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).”
Recommendation To the international community
With the partial signing of NCA, the role of international
community is becoming more
important in ensuring
that the peace process is followed through to the end. It is good to be sensitive to the politics surrounding the whole peace process including the current dynamics
between
the signatories and non-signatories within EAOs. However, wait-and-see approach and being
concerned about political correctness
are no
longer
relevant. Otherwise,
international
community will be running the risk of being labelled again, “the international communities have no friend, but only promote their interests”. There are at least two things they can do to continue supporting the peace process. One is to beef up their diplomatic engagement effort
with the government
of
Myanmar through bilateral and multilateral channel, and another is funding the peace process. More or less, many countries have already
done
the underlined
two things and their diplomatic missions in Myanmar
deserved appreciations.
In order for the
peace process to be successful, it is necessary that all relevant stakeholders are supporting it. At the end, achieving
lasting peace in Myanmar
serves the shared interest of all citizens of Myanmar, which is a pre-requisite for the consolidation
and sustainability
of democratic
practices in this country. The less there are spoilers, the better chance the peace process has to achieve its objectives. As such, continue trying to get the buy-in from all relevant groups who might not support the process is becoming more salient. There are two main areas that people who do not support the peace process are attentive to: the ongoing
military
offensives (hostilities and violence in ethnic states due to armed conflicts) and the
compliance of the agreed NCA text. The international community can play an instrumental role in these two areas. First, through their diplomatic engagement, they can encourage as
well
as gently pressure the government of Myanmar – army in particular- to reduce (if not eliminate) their military offensives in ethnic states especially Shan and Kachin. Second, as
implementation and compliance with the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement is one of the most
important areas of the process moving forward, the international community can scale up their
funding
to help parties to the agreement effectively carry out all programs and activities mandated in the NCA. What is and will be required is continued funding of the whole peace process.
The very big picture that the international
community – especially donor communities- in
particular still miss out is the depth and longevity of the sacrifices that members of the armed
resistance organizations
have to suffer and endure as a result of their armed struggles. Talk to
the
real EAO members who choose to take up arm to fight for their people`s self-
determination, it is obvious that they would mention about how they brag about fighting for their people`s political destiny with unspeakable level of suffering in the jungles - no food, no
proper clothing, and so on. “The time now has changed from the time we first joined armed
struggle some years ago,” said one EAO leader, who is now a leading member of the Joint Implementation Coordinating Committee (JICM). Even now, do not ask me about how I take
care of my own family needs and pay for my own food, I have nothing. Sometimes, I do not have money to pay for my taxi fare in Yangon when I came for a meeting,” he added. And, he challenges with question, “With these difficulties that all my fellow members of ethnic armed organizations have to face, how can we focus on the peace process full-time like others who
get a professional monthly salary?”
The fact that the political fate of 55 million of the people of Burma will be impacted by the decisions of these members of the ethnic armed organizations, any peace donor country or institution has to seriously consider finding ways to support all key-stakeholders, especially ethnic armed organization leaders equally with the government of Myanmar. For the last 3 years, the funding that donor communities allocate to Myanmar peace process is too one- sided in the views of EAO leaders: members of
ethnic armed organizations feel that they are
under-resourced
financially
when
they
look at
the
lucrative
amount of funding the
government of Myanmar has received in the name of peace process. In the views of ethnic
armed organizations, 80 percent of the so-called funding for Myanmar peace process from
foreign countries as well as institutions is geared towards supporting
only
the government of
Myanmar and its technical teams. “It is not fair for members of the government technical
team (they are not even the policy makers) to receive a fat monthly salary from peace donor countries while most of our EAO key actors on the peace process have no money to pay for our
own basic needs, let
alone the salary to survive” said, one EAO veteran leader.
They
also complain the fact that the government has surplus financial resources to organize a
large public gathering in different capitals of Myanmar
to tell their own versions of the peace process
while EAOs have no penny to run any workshop to do the same. “We want to tell our
people about our own version of the peace process, but we do not have the resources to do so. How can
we expect our people to stay abreast of
what we do?” Overall, one should rightly question the decision of some of the peace donor countries, especially who would give 80
percent of their funding for Myanmar peace process to only the government of Myanmar
and its technical team, while members of ethnic armed organizations have to struggle financially
even to pay for their own food when they come to Naypidaw and Yangon for meeting with
the
government? With these kinds of financial imbalances facing the whole process, the time
has come for members of
the Peace donor countries and institutions to review their funding policies and take a balanced approach in managing
their peace funds to equally fund both parties in future. It is also advisable that the government of Myanmar allocate enough budgets for their own peace process from their own revenues.
EAO leaders must educate their own constituencies
In talking with some leaders of the non-signatories to NCA, one of the reasons that they gave
in not signing NCA is the oppostion
from the general public. “When we consult with our public about whether we should sign NCA, their response is that we should not”. As they want to embody democratic values in their movement, it makes sense for leaders of EAO to
be very concerned about the voice of the public. However, one has to note that the overwhelming majority of the general publics are not well-informed about the text of the NCA. Not just the general public, the unfortunate reality is that not all leaders of the EAO have a full understanding
of the provisions of the NCA. This lack of a clear understanding
about the ultimate goal of peace process, the steps it would take, and all the agreed clauses of NCA are very concerning. Without fully understanding what is in the agreement, how would one
know about the benefits as well as the flaws of NCA?
Quite frankly, any EAO leader to make a final decision about either the signing or against the signing of NCA without fully understanding the text of NCA is very risky politically. The same is true for the general
public. It is possible that the general public do not have a full
understanding of the NCA text. They might urge their leaders not to sign simply because they
see the military offensives still ongoing in some parts of Burma. If there are some EAO leaders who would not sign NCA just because the general public is not supporting it, then
what becomes absolutely necessary is to educate the general public about the
content, process, and both the advantages and disadvantages for ethnic people according to the text of the NCA. No one should use the general public as the scapegoat for either signing or not signing NCA. It would be unfair to expect the general public to say yes or no
to the signing when they
are not well-informed
about the NCA. Therefore, if the general public voice is used as either for signing or against NCA, the time has come for leaders of EAO to thoroughly study the
content of NCA and educate the general public.
Conclusion
All parties who signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
(NCA) have made a strong
commitment and take the systematic steps to materialize the agreed clauses in the NCA. These levels of commitment, cooperation, and joint steps actively taken for the historic peace process
have never
existed in the history of this country. In fact, all parties who join the peace process are making a sustained effort to find a negotiated solution to the very root cause of the country`s political crisis, without which there can never be lasting peace in the country
of Myanmar. By signing the NCA, all parties commit to a peaceful mean of political dialogue:
the government abandons its policy of more-than-half a century by committing to the goal of achieving democracy and federalism; the Armed forces also agreed by signing the NCA that
the
country`s problem can only be resolved not on the battle field, but on a political dialogue
table. The same way, the ethnic armed organizations also denounce the right of secession
by signing the
NCA,
and
committed to
ensuring the
integration of the common Union of Myanmar under a genuine federal system. All sides abandon
their all creeds to take a new
political step
for the future betterment of the
common Union. But,
unless the
NCA is
implemented to
fully materialize, such commitments will remain only on paper.